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HOW AMERICAN WORKERS LOST THE
RIGHT TO STRIKE, AND OTHER TALES
James Gray Pope*

To paraphrase a veteran labor scholar, if you want to know where
the corpses are buried in labor law, look for the "of course"
statements in court opinions.1 By "of course" statements, he meant
propositions that are announced as if they were self-evident, requiring
no justification. Each year, thousands of law students read such
statements in labor law casebooks. And each year, they duly ask
themselves - prodded sometimes by the casebook's notes - how
these conclusions could be justified in legal terms. But often there
seems to be no answer, and the mystery continues.
This Essay recounts the origins of five such "of course" statements,
each of which has had a devastating impact on the American labor
movement. The five statements are:
1) Of course, workers have no right of self-defense against
employers that commit unfair labor practices.2
2) Of course, employers enjoy the right to permanently
replace economic strikers. 3
3) Of course, the National Labor Relations Board has no
power to deter unfair labor practices.4
4) Of course, employers may exclude union organizers
from their property.5
5) Of course, employers may close operations out of

* Professor of Law & Sidney Reitman Scholar, Rutgers University School of Law Newark. A.B. 1974 , J.D. 1983, Harvard. Ph.D. (Politics) 2004 , Princeton. - Ed. Funding for
this Essay was provided by the Rutgers Law School Dean's Research Fund. The author is
grateful to Jim Atleson, Marion Crain, Ellen Dannin, Cynthia Estlund, and Alan Hyde for
their frank criticisms and helpful suggestions.
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2. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257-58 (1939). See discussion
infra Part I.
3. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938). See discussion infra
Part II.
III.

4. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938). See discussion infra Part

5. NLRB v. Babcock and. Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 1 14 (1956); Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537 (1992). See discussion infra Part IV.
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"spite" against workers who choose to unionize.6
These statements all share one puzzling feature. In the accepted
hierarchy of laws, only the United States Constitution can trump
federal statutes.7 Yet each of these statements elevates the state
common-law rights of employers over the federal statutory rights of
workers.8 This strange phenomenon gives rise to a hypothesis: If the
Constitution is the only source of law with sufficient authority to
provide a legal justification for these "of course" statements, then
maybe they can be traced to constitutional thinking. To give credit
where credit is due, this is not my idea; it builds on an observation by
then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist:
From its earliest cases construing the National Labor Relations Act the
Court has recognized the weight of an employer's property rights, rights
which are explicitly protected from federal interference by the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution. The Court has not been quick to
conclude in a given instance that Congress has authorized the displace
ment of those rights by the federally created rights of the employees.9

In support of this claim, Justice Rehnquist cited NLRB v. Fansteel
Corporation,10 the source of our first "of course"
statement. But he left the other cases unspecified. The five stories that
follow (Parts I-V) confirm the accuracy of the Rehnquist thesis as
applied to Fansteel, and suggest that - if we include liberty of contract
and the Commerce Clause along with property rights - the other four
"of course" statements can be explained as rooted in the Constitution
as well. In each of the five cases, the Court revived Lochner-era
doctrines - supposedly defunct since the "switch in time that saved
nine" in 1937 - and applied them to cut back on statutory labor
rights. Once again, judges have deprived workers of the rights to
organize and strike, but this time without the forthright constitutional
reasoning of the pre-1937 period.
How did this happen? Why did the Court hide the constitutional
ball in "of course" statements? What are the implications for labor law
today? Part VI concludes the Essay by addressing those questions.
Metallurgical

6. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg.
discussion infra Part V.

Co.,

380 U.S. 263, 268-70 (1965). See

7. See Carlos E. Gonzalez, Popular Sovereign Generated Versus Government Institution
Generated Constitutional Norms: When Does a Constitutional Amendment Not Amend the
Constitution?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 127, 142-48 (2002) (analyzing in depth the operation of
trumping norms in cases of legal conflict, including the trumping power of federal statutory
law over state common law and of federal constitutional law over federal statutory law).
8. These cases exemplify a general tendency of courts to privilege employer common
law rights over worker statutory rights. On this tendency, see ATLESON, supra note 1, at 910; Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 293-97 (1978).
9. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 580 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10. 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
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AMERICAN WORKERS LOST THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

On February 17, 1 937, members of the Steel Workers Organizing
Committee at the Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation occupied two
buildings of the factory and commenced a sit-down strike. That same
day, management told the strikers that they were fired. 11 After a court
enjoined the strikers to cease their occupation, a force of 1 40 police
officers armed with tear gas guns and baseball bats assaulted the plant
only to be repulsed by strikers hurling nuts, bolts, and other objects. A
second attempt, conducted before dawn with a larger force,
succeeded. During both attacks windows were broken and other
company property damaged. After their eviction from the plant, a
majority of the strikers were convicted of contempt of court and
sentenced to fines and substantial j ail terms.12
The strikers claimed that they had rightfully occupied the factories
in self-defense of their right to organize, protected under the recently
enacted National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).1 3 Prior to the sit
down, the corporation had committed a variety of unfair labor
practices over a period of six months, including planting a spy in the
local union, transferring the local's president to an isolated location,
establishing a company-dominated union, and announcing that
management would never bargain with the union under any
circumstances.14 The workers had filed charges with the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB),15 but five months had gone by with
no action. One union leader recalled: " [T)he members of the lodge felt
that . . . we were letting the company push us around, and we were not
sticking up for their rights as they considered them under the Wagner
labor law. . . . [T)hey demanded we do something."16 Meanwhile,
Fansteel's spy within the union was acting as an agent provocateur,
urging the workers to go out on a traditional outside strike - thus
giving the company an opportunity to break the union by bringing in
striker replacements.17 Caught between the necessity for action and
11. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 942 (1938), enforcement denied, 98
F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1938), rev'd in part, 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
12 Id. at 942-43.
13. See James Gray Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down Strikes, and the Shaping of
American Industrial Relations, 1935-1958 LAW & HISTORY (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript
at 28-35).
14. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. at 251-52; Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5
N.L.R.B. at 935.
15. Record at 23-24, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (No.
436) [hereinafter Fansteel Record).
16. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Edward F. Prichard, Jr., The Fansteel Case: Employee
Misconduct and the Remedial Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 1275, 1280-81 (1939).
17. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. , 5 N.L.R.B. at 939; Fansteel Record, supra note 15, at
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the perils of a traditional strike, the unionists resorted to the sit-down.
The NLRB bypassed the workers' claim of self-defense by
ordering Fansteel to reinstate the strikers as a remedy for the
company's pre-strike unfair labor practices.18 The Supreme Court, on
the other hand, squarely confronted the issue of whether the sit-down
was protected under the NLRA. In an opinion by Chief Justice
Hughes, the Court held that the Board could not reinstate sit-downers
even though their strike would not have occurred but for the
employer's violations of law. According to the Chief Justice, the
strikers lost their status as statutory "employees" when Fansteel
discharged them. And since the NLRB was empowered to reinstate
only "employees," it could not reinstate the fired strikers.19 Why was it
legal for Fansteel to terminate employees for responding with self
help to its own statutory violations? The opinion made it clear that the
employer's common-law property rights were of a different and higher
order than the employees' statutory labor rights. While the company's
repeated violations of the workers' right to organize did not deprive
the company of "its legal rights to the possession and protection of its
property," the workers' violation of the employer's property rights put
them "outside the protection of the statute."20 At no point in his
opinion for the majority did Chief Justice Hughes mention the impact
of the employer's unfair labor practices on the workers' statutory
rights. In fact, the Court was so little concerned about the
corporation's violations that it referred to the sit-down as "an illegal
seizure of the buildings in order to prevent their use by the employer
in a lawful manner. "2 1
How did the corporation's common law property rights rise so far
above the workers' statutory rights? Constitutional law operated both
to pump up the former and to deflate the latter. In NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin, the Court had upheld the Board's power to reinstate a
worker fired for union activity, but only because the Act allowed the
employer to fire a worker for any other reason, and thus did "not
389, 394-95; Hart & Prichard, supra note 16, at 1280-81. At the time of the Fanstee/ strike,
the Board had already developed the rule that workers who struck in protest of unfair labor
practices could not be permanently replaced. Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 248 (1936),
enforced as modified, 94 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 575 (1938); Jefferey
De Witt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 618 (1936), enforced, 91 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1937), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937). But relying on this rule would do nothing to protect the workers
or their union during the period that unfair labor practice charges were pending - a period
that, judging from the five-month delay that had already ensued since the union filed its
charges, would be a long one.
18. The Board reasoned that reinstatement was necessary to restore the status quo
prevailing prior to the employer's violations. Fanstee/ Metallurgic Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. at 94950.
19. Fansteel Metallurgic Corp., 306 U.S. at 252-53, 255.
20. Id. at 253, 256-57.
21. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
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interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to
select its employees or to discharge them."22 In Fansteel, Chief Justice
Hughes characterized the issue as whether the Act abrogated the
employer's right to fire workers who had illegally seized its property
- certainly a "normal" exercise of the right to discharge.2 3 "Apart
from the question of the constitutional validity of an enactment of that
sort," he wrote, "it is enough to say that such a legislative intention
should be found in some definite and unmistakable expression."24 The
Chief Justice did not cite any authority for the existence of a
constitutional right to discharge workers, a gap that was filled in
Fansteel's brief with citations to the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment and to the Lochner-era cases of Adair v. United States
and Coppage v. Kansas.25 Thus, in both Jones & Laughlin and Fansteel,
the Court affirmed that employers continued to enjoy a constitutional
right to discharge workers under the due process clause.
While the employer's right to fire workers rose to the
constitutional level, the workers' statutory right to organize all but
disappeared from consideration. This too had its roots in
constitutional thinking, here grounded on the Commerce Clause. In
Jones & Laughlin, the Court had held that a Board order could
survive constitutional challenge only if the particular unfair labor
practices at issue actually affected interstate commerce and thus fell
within Congress's commerce power.2 6 NLRB General Counsel Charles
Fahy interpreted this to mean that the reach of the Act to a particular
enterprise hinged on whether "stoppage of . . . operations by industrial
strife" in that enterprise would substantially interrupt or interfere with
interstate commerce.27 In its anxiousness to win this point, the Board
focused solely on the commerce-protecting purpose of the Act, which
tended to cast unions and strikers as dangerous disruptors of
commerce. Forgotten were other NLRA policies that might have
22. 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937).
23.

Fansteel Metallurgic Corp., 306 U.S. at 252.

24. Id. at 255. Justice Stone's concurrence took a similar approach, observing that if the
Act had expressed an intention to bar employers from discharging workers for "unlawful
practices," he "should have thought it of sufficiently dubious constitutionality to require us
to construe its language otherwise, if that could reasonably be done . . . . " Id. at 265 (Stone,
J., concurring).
25. Brief for Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. at 33, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,
306 U.S. 240 (1938) (No. 436) (citing Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking
down federal statutory prohibition on yellow dog contracts, partly on 5th amendment due
process grounds), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating state statutory
prohibition on yellow dog contracts as a violation of the due process clause of the 14th
amendment)).
26. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 30-31 (citing National Labor Relations Act § lO(a), 29
U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000)).
27. See Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 83 L. Ed. 126, 132 (1938) (Lawyers' Edition
summary of Fahy's argument).
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offered stronger support for the Board's orders - policies like
"restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees," "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining," and "protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing. "28
The Court went a step further. Not only did the Justices follow the
Board in skipping over these policies and focusing solely on protecting
commerce, but they also substituted their own judgment for that of
Congress as to how commerce would best be protected. Section 1 of
the Act declared that it was "the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow
of commerce . . . by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing. . . . "29 The causes to be eliminated were the
"denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and
the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining." 30 In this light, it seems clear that - whatever else they
were doing - the Fansteel strikers were serving the primary purpose
of the Act by enforcing its guarantee of the right to organize and
thereby helping to "eliminate the causes" of strikes. The NLRB had
failed to take action on their unfair labor practice charge, filed five
months before the sit-down, and their union was threatened with
destruction due to the employer's violations. An outside strike would
have exposed the workers to replacement, a danger underscored by
the fact that the company's spy in the union was urging that course of
action. 31 Only by sitting down could the workers prevent the employer
from reaping the benefits of its violations.
To the Court, however, the need for a prompt remedy did not
register in the balance. Chief Justice Hughes declined to consider
whether the workers' mode of enforcement was necessary or effective,
but considered only whether it was peaceful. Since the sit-down strike
involved "force and violence in defiance of the law of the land," it
clearly did not promote industrial peace. 32 The procedures of the Act,
on the other hand, were "peaceful." The Court did not pause to
consider whether the Board's peaceful processes could, as a practical
matter, remedy the employer's destruction of the union's majority
support. Thus, the statutory strategy of eliminating the causes of

28. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 939 (1938); Hart & Prichard,
note 16, at 1280-81.
32. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgic Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 258 (1939).

supra
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disruptions to commerce fell out of the equation.33
The Court's lack of concern for the workers' statutory rights
cannot be blamed entirely on Chief Justice Hughes or the Fansteel
majority. The statute itself reduced the workers' rights to the status of
mere means to the end of preventing disruptions to commerce. This
was the result of a conscious choice by the bill's creator, Senator
Robert Wagner of New York. Labor leaders and others had urged the
Senator to ground his bill not on Congress's commerce power but on
its human rights powers. To Andrew Furuseth, the labor movement's
leading constitutional thinker, the bill exemplified the "Christian
principle of evolution from slavery to freedom," which belonged
under the Thirteenth Amendment, not the Commerce Clause.34
Philosophically, Senator Wagner took a similar view of his bill. Along
with other proponents of the NLRA, he likened the non-union
workplace to feudalism and slavery, and he promised that government
enforcement of the right to organize would bestow upon workers
"emancipation from economic slavery and . . . an opportunity to walk
the streets free men in fact as well as in name. "35
But Senator Wagner adhered to the commerce power as a
constitutional justification, apparently in the belief that it was more
acceptable to middle-class reformers and judges.3 6 As a result, each
exercise of the NLRB 's authority had to be justified not in terms of
labor freedom, but as an effort to prevent disruptions to commerce.
During the early, formative period of NLRA jurisprudence, this
constitutional requirement shaped the developing interpretation of the
statute. Even the Board's own lawyers defended the Act as an exercise
of Congress's power to "control" and "punish" strikes under Lochner
era precedents.37 In its Fansteel opinion, as we have seen, the Board
33. H art & Prichard, supra note 16, at 1321-22.
34. Letter from Andrew Furuseth, President, International Seamen's Union, to Senator
Robert F. Wagner (Apr. 16, 1935), in Robert F. Wagner Papers, Labor Series, box 4, folder
39, Georgetown Univ. Special Collections; see also James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth
Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American
Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14, 54-55 (2002) [hereinafter Pope,
Thirteenth Amendment] (reporting the American Federation of Labor's proposal to ground
the bill on the Republican Government Clause of Article IV, and others' advocacy of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
35. 79 CONG .

REC.

6184 (1935) (address by Senator Wagner), reprinted in 2 NLRB,

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2284 (1949)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] ; see also To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings

on S. 2926 Before the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 73 Cong. 467-68 (1934) (statement of Guy
L. Harrington), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 501-02 (quoting Senator
Wagner's insistence that "all [the bill] does is to make the worker a free man"). For other
quotations, see Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 47-50.
36. See Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 55-56.
37. See

ARGUMENTS IN THE CASES ARISING UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AND

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT B EFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, S. Doc. No. 75-52, at 124, 171 (1937); Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 34,
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focused solely on the protection of commerce, failing even to mention
the express statutory policies in favor of equal bargaining power,
freedom of association, or collective bargaining. In hindsight, it seems
inevitable that courts would be tempted to bypass those policies
and directly discourage workers from striking, thereby protecting
commerce.
Senator Wagner foresaw this possibility and inserted language to
prevent it. Section 13 provided that "[n]othing in this Act shall be
construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
right to strike. "38 The Senator explained that the Act was designed "to
reduce the number of strikes by eliminating the main wrongs and
injustices that cause strikes." Accordingly, the "imposition of legal
restrictions upon the right to strike, instead of removing these wrongs,
would merely deprive the worker of his inalienable right to protest
against them. "39
But Fansteel demonstrated the inadequacy of section 1 3 as a
control on judges. Chief Justice Hughes easily dismissed the strikers'
section 13 argument on the ground that "the right to strike" encom
passed only "the unquestioned right to quit work."40 Senator Wagner's
broader view of section 1 3 ("I would not buy peace," he said, "at the
price of slavery"41) dropped out. The Court did not even consider the
price of peace in Fansteel. And the peace that followed its decision was
one of unbridled employer domination. By barring the Board from
reinstating the strikers, the Court left Fansteel with a workforce
composed of striker replacements and workers who had crossed the
union's picket lines. This workforce rejected the Steel Workers
Organizing Committee and voted to be represented by an in-house
union, which Fansteel promptly recognized as the exclusive represen
tative for all its production employees.42 This "union" negotiated a
grievance procedure culminating in a final decision not by an impartial
arbitrator, but by Fansteel's President, R.J. Aitchison. In April of
1 939, Aitchison looked back with satisfaction on the course of events.
Relations with the employees were "closer than ever before" - so
close that not a single grievance had been filed under the new
at 81-82.
38. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 13, 49 Stat. 449, 457 (1935).
39. National Labor Relations Act and Proposed Amendments: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 76th Cong. 17 (1939) (statement of Senator Robert F. Wagner)
(quoted in Leon H. Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER ACT: AFrER TEN
YEARS 31 (Louis G. Silverberg ed., 1945)).
40. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256 (1939).
41. 78
at 1241.

CONG. REC.

12044 (1934), reprinted in 1

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra note 35,

42. H. E. Fleming, In the Wake of a Sit-down Strike, 46 CHEMICAL & METALLURGICAL
(1939).

ENGINEERING 624, 625
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procedure.4 3 "You could either be embittered or liberalized by an
experience like ours," he observed. "I think I have been liberalized."44
In what did this liberalization consist? Not in any regret for the
company's unfair labor practices, but in "explaining more to the
employees and in giving more attention to employee relations."45
Not only did Aitchison enjoy the new docility of his workforce, but
he also received a raft of "fan mail" from other employers congratu
lating the company on its historic victory.46 Just how historic became
increasingly apparent over time. The courts and, eventually, the
NLRB read Fansteel broadly to authorize the discharge of workers for
engaging in slow-downs and other partial strike activities.47 More
recently, the Supreme Court relied on Fansteel to support its decision
in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, denying backpay to
undocumented aliens who had been fired for j oining a labor union.48
In Hoffman, as in Fansteel, both the workers and the company had
violated the law. And as in Fansteel, the Court held that the workers'
violations deprived them of their remedy for the employer's
violations. Thus, the workers suffered not only the legal penalties for
their lawbreaking - imprisonment and fines in Fansteel, deportation
in Hoffman
but also the disruption of their unions and the loss of
jobs and pay. By contrast, the employers in both cases enjoyed the
benefits of their lawbreaking, unimpeded by any sanction other than
an order to post notices promising to refrain from future violations notices that might as well have bragged: "Look what we got away
with." Hoffman has effectively created "an underclass of low-wage
Latino immigrants" whose legal status resembles that of slavery or
involuntary servitude in its denial of any effective remedy for
violations of worker rights.49
-

43. Id. at 627.
44.

Id.

45. Id. at 627.
46. Id.
47. Craig Becker, "Better Than a Strike": Protecting New Forms of Collective Work
Stoppages under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 368-69 nn.77 & 83
(1994).
48. 535 U.S. 137, 142-43 (2002) (citing Fansteel as an instance in which awards of
reinstatement and backpay were rightly set aside because of serious employee misconduct).
49. Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court's Role in Making Federal
Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (2003); Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an
Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor
Laws, 36 U. MICH. J L. REFORM 737, 754-55 (2003); Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant
Workers' Rights in a Post-Hoffman World B Organizing around the Thineenth Amendment
(forthcoming).
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How AMERICAN WORKERS LOST THE RIGHT TO STRIKE

In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., the Supreme Court
laid down a dictum that has puzzled legal scholars and vexed unions
increasingly over the years. so According to this dictum, an employer
enjoys the right permanently to replace workers who strike for better
wages and conditions. The dictum is puzzling because the strike is one
of those "concerted activities" protected under section 7, and
employers are prohibited from discharging or otherwise interfering
with, restraining, coercing or discriminating against employees for
exercising section 7 rights. s1 Yet the Mackay Court simply asserted the
employer right, offering no explanation why strikers - who are
admittedly protected against "discharge" - can nevertheless be
replaced permanently at the discretion of the employer.
The employer's right to hire permanent replacements operates as
an unqualified trump over the section 7 right to strike for better
conditions and higher wages. The employer need not show any
business reason for its exercise (for example, that unless replacements
are offered permanent employment the company will be unable to
continue operating) , and the rule leaves no room for the Board to
argue that the impact of permanent replacement on the section 7 right
outweighs the employer's interest. s2 Theoretically, an employer
violates the Act if it replaces strikers for reasons of anti-union animus.
But because animus is virtually impossible to prove (unless the
employer is clumsy enough to reveal it in public), the law does nothing
to prevent an employer from seizing on the strike as an opportunity to
replace union with nonunion workers. s3 In effect, when workers go out
on strike, they give the employer a license to discriminate; the
employer need only limit itself to (1) "permanently replacing" union
workers as opposed to "discharging" them, and (2) discriminating only
between strikebreakers and strikers as opposed to discriminating
among loyal strikers (as on the facts of Mackay, where the employer
targeted active unionists for replacement) or among strikebreakers.
The result is a bizarre reversal of the strike's traditional function.
50. 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
51. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(l), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l), (3) (2000); see
Eileen Silverstein, If You Can't Beat 'em, Learn to Lose, but Never Join Them, 30 CONN. L.
REV. 1371, 1373 (1998) ("As an exercise in statutory interpretation, even the most
conservative students have wondered at a result that honors, on the one hand, the
prohibition against discharging employees because they strike, but allows, on the other hand,
replacement of strikers and retention of strikebreakers once the dispute has ended.").
52 See JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW
164 (2d ed. 1999); ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 329 (1976).
53. GETMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 163; George Schatzki, Some Observations and
Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer - "Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV.
378, 383 (1969).
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Although the strike is legally protected so that it can provide workers
with a source of bargaining power, it now serves as a source of
employer bargaining power. According to a recent study of collective
bargaining negotiations, employers are now more likely to threaten
permanent replacement than unions are to threaten a strike.54 As
Cynthia Estlund recently put it, the Mackay dictum has "rendered the
strike useless and virtually suicidal for many employees, and has
become employers' Exhibit Number One in union organizing
campaigns. "55 As employers have turned increasingly to permanent
replacements, the incidence of strikes has dropped sharply.56 That the
labor movement considers the Mackay dictum to be a serious problem
is evidenced by the fact that in 1 996, at a time when the Presidency
and both houses of Congress were held by Democrats, the AFL-CIO
launched an intense campaign for legislation to overturn it - only to
see the bill succumb twice to Senate filibusters.57
The Mackay Court cited no source and offered no reasoning to
support the existence of an employer right permanently to replace
strikers.58 The statutory language, which makes it an unfair labor
practice for the employer to engage in "discrimination" based on
union activity or to "coerce" employees in the exercise of their section
7 rights, appears to negate any such right.59 An employer that retains
nonstriking workers at the end of a strike while denying returning
strikers their jobs is certainly discriminating - in the ordinary
meaning of the word - based on union activity.60 Workers who cross
54. See Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, The Social Contract at the Bargaining Table: Evidence
from a National Survey of Labor and Management Negotiators, in 2 INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 51ST ANNUAL
MEETING 214, 216-19 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1999).
55. JULIUS GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14, at 224-28 (1998); WILLIAM B.
GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 185-88, 202-03 (1993); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING
THE WORKPLACE: THE FuTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 264-69 (1990); Cynthia
L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1538 (2002)
(hereinafter Estlund, Ossification] (citing CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? 29,
132-34, 143-46 (1993); Michael H. Gottesman, Union Summer: A Reawakened Interest in the
Law of Labor?, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 293-96 (1996); James J. Brudney, To Strike or Not
to Strike, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 65, 71-72, 80-81 (1999) (book review)).
56. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical
Review and Critical A ssessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 440-41 (2002).
57. Estlund, Ossification, supra note 55, at 1541.
58. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. at 345-46.
59. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(l), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l), (3) (2000 ).
60. See ATLESON, supra note 1, at 24-25; GORMAN, supra note 52, at 329. Employers
sometimes argue that there are no positions for the returning strikers because the
replacements are in current possession. However, the strikers were in possession prior to the
strike, and section 2(3) of the Act specifies that "any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair
labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent
employment" remains an "employee." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).

December 2004)

How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike

529

picket lines are rewarded with permanent jobs, while workers who
exercise their statutory right to strike are punished with the loss of
their jobs. And there are few more potent forms of coercion than
forcing individual workers to choose between a protected activity and
losing their jobs to permanent replacements. Whether the loss of a job
comes as a result of a discharge (concededly illegal) or of "permanent
replacement," it certainly constitutes a powerful disincentive to
engage in protected activity. Furthermore, at the time of Mackay,
section 13 of the Act barred courts not only from construing the Act to
impose direct legal restraints on the right to strike, but also from
reading it to "interfere with or impede or diminish" the right "in any
way."61
Commentators have tried to fit the Mackay dictum into the
structure of current law by asserting that it rests on the assumption
that employers have a legitimate business need to offer prospective
replacements permanent employment in order to operate during
strikes.62 But the Court never made any such determination, and there
is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the Justices were thinking
along those lines. If they were, then they were simply wrong on the
facts. Employers routinely succeed in obtaining striker replacements
without offering permanent employment, and there is no evidence
that they need to make such offers.63 Moreover, the Mackay dictum
would not fit into the structure of current law even if employers could
show that they were motivated by a desire to attract replacement
workers. Under the current standard, which outlaws employer
countermeasures that are "inherently destructive" of section 7 rights
even if the employer acted out of legitimate business reasons, the
hiring of permanent replacement workers would seem to be inherently
destructive just as discharge is inherently destructive.64 In short, the
Mackay dictum cannot be explained or rationalized with reference to
the employer's need to hire striker replacements.
Looking at the paper trail leading up to the dictum, we find that
the issue was treated not as a question of the employer's business
necessity, but rather as a matter of constitutional law. As in Fansteel,
the employer claimed constitutional protection for its freedom to
terminate strikers, and argued that termination would promote the
statute's constitutional purpose of preventing disruptions to interstate
61. National Labor Relations Act, § 13, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169).
62. See GETMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 164; GORMAN, supra note 52, at 329.
63. See Hal Keith Gillespie, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity,
50 TEX. L. REV. 782, 788-95 (1972); Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of
Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 391 (1984).
64. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967); ATLESON, supra note 1,
at 27-28.
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commerce. Mackay Company lawyers contended that a Board order
reinstating economic strikers would deprive the employer of its
property and liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. As long as
the employer had not provoked the strike by unfair labor practices, its
"ordinary right" to select its employees remained "invulnerable."
And, although strikers technically remained employees, they had no
current contractual relation with their employer. Thus, concluded
Mackay's lawyers, a Board order reinstating strikers would, in effect,
force the employer to enter into a new contract with the strikers - a
clear violation of the Fifth Amendment.65 In addition, the company's
lawyers argued that strikers should be faced with the possibility of
losing their jobs permanently, because that threat would discourage
them from striking, thus promoting the statutory policy of preventing
disruptions to interstate commerce.66 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit twice ruled for the employer, with Judge Curtis Wilbur
writing two lead opinions adopting Mackay's Fifth Amendment theory
- one before Jones & L aughlin and one afterward, on rehearing.67
While Mackay's lawyers and Judge Wilbur elevated the employer's
rights to the constitutional level, the NLRB subsumed the workers'
rights into the Act's constitutional purpose of preventing disruptions
to interstate commerce. Employer interference with union activity
tended to provoke strikes, reasoned the Board, and strikes injured
commerce - as illustrated by the Mackay strike itself, which
drastically reduced the company's communications traffic and resulted
in considerable loss of business. 68 This argument fit right in with the
constitutional theory embraced by the Supreme Court in Jones &
Laughlin and its companion cases, but it also portrayed the strikers'
legally protected activity as a kind of economic vandalism. It
dovetailed with the employer's argument that to grant the Board
power to reinstate strikers "would thwart rather than accomplish" the
Act's purposes because, " [b]y guaranteeing a striker his job, . . .
peaceful negotiation would be discouraged and strikes would be
65. Brief for Respondent at 30, 40-41, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938) (No. 37-706) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent Mackay].
66. Id. at 26.
67. Judge Wilbur's first opinion construed the statute to grant the power to reinstate
economic strikers and then declared it unconstitutional on Fifth Amendment grounds, citing
such economic due process cases as Adair, Coppage, and Lochner. NLRB v. Mackay Radio
& Tel. Co., 87 F.2d 611, 615-18 (9th Cir. 1937), rev'd 304 U.S. 333 (1938), remanded to 92
F.2d 761, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1937). The judge's second opinion applied the clear statement rule
to find that the statute - "properly construed in the light of the Constitution" - did not
empower the Board to reinstate economic strikers. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 92
F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1937). On both occasions, a second judge concurred on
nonconstitutional grounds while a third dissented. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 87 F.2d at 631,
632; Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 92 F.2d at 765.
68. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 201, 231 (1936), enforcement denied, 87 F.2d
611 (9th Cir. 1937), rev'd 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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encouraged. "69 The Board made no mention of the statutory policies
in favor of equal bargaining power or full freedom of association. Nor
did it make any mention of section 13, which had been inserted into
the Act precisely to ensure that the right to strike would not be
suppressed as a means of obtaining industrial peace.70
As to the specific issue of permanent replacement, the Board
based its original finding of a violation not on the company's refusal to
reinstate economic strikers per se, but on its discrimination among
returning strikers in selecting who would fill the positions that were
available at the end of the strike. The opinion explained that the
employer had illegally refused to reinstate union officers and activists
while, at the same time, reinstating less active strikers. The Board
declined to address the broader question of the employer's right to
retain replacement workers in preference to economic strikers
because "a decision on the point is not necessary to the final
judgment. "71 But in the Supreme Court, the Board's General Counsel,
Charles Fahy, conceded that an employer could replace strikers and
then, at the conclusion of the strike, retain the replacements and
refuse to reinstate the would-be returning strikers.72
Scholars have wondered why Fahy made this apparently gratuitous
concession. From a constitutional perspective, however, it does not
appear gratuitous. Throughout the litigation, Mackay's lawyers and
the Court of Appeals majority had insisted that the Board was seeking
a general power to reinstate economic strikers at the end of the strike.
In the Court of Appeals' first decision, Judge Wilbur's lead opinion
went so far as to claim that the Board had relied "solely" on the broad
contention that it was unlawful for the employer to refuse to reinstate
economic strikers.73 From the Board's point of view, this was nothing
more than an obfuscation; the Board had claimed only the limited
power to remedy discrimination among the strikers. But from the
point of view of the employer and the Court of Appeals majority,
whose approach to the case centered on preserving the employer's
"normal" Fifth Amendment right to select its employees, this was a
distinction without a difference. Either way, the employer would be
forced to make new contracts with strikers who had - voluntarily and
unprovoked by any employer unfair labor practices - terminated
their previous contractual relations by going on strike.74
69. Brief for Respondent Mackay, supra note 65, at 27.
70. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
71. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. at 218.
72. Reply Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 15-17, NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (No. 37-706) [hereinafter NLRB Reply Brief].
73. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 87 F.2d at 628.
74. See Brief for Respondent Mackay, supra note 65, at 31-33.
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At first, Fahy responded to this problem by trying to clarify the
Board's position. In June 1937, he urged his regional lawyers to
explain on rehearing that the Board's order hinged not on
discrimination against strikers generally, but on discrimination for
union membership and leadership among the returning strikers.75 At
this point, there was no talk of any concession; Fahy continued to
follow the Board's original approach of distinguishing - without
conceding - the permanent replacement issue. But the Court of
Appeals again conflated the issues and accepted Mackay's economic
due process argument.76 Fahy responded by attempting once more to
explain without making any concession, this time in the Board's initial
brief to the Supreme Court.77 But Mackay's lawyers ignored this
explanation and insisted yet again that the Board was claiming a
general power to reinstate economic strikers in preference to
replacement workers - a power "so obnoxious to the basic principles
of our Bill of Rights that it cannot stand."78 It was at this point, in the
Board's reply brief, that Fahy made his fateful concession as part of a
seven-page discourse explaining, from every possible angle, that the
company's argument rested on a "gross misstatement of the Board's
position."79
Of course, we can never know for certain the reason for Fahy's
decision.80 Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that he was
75. Fahy suggested that "it would be wise to refute the statement in Judge Wilbur's
opinion that the Board predicated its conclusion of discrimination 'upon the inference
arising from the refusal of the respondent to reemploy these individuals solely from the fact
that they were union employees who had been engaged actively in an unsuccessful strike and
who desired and were refused reemployment,"' and pointed out the fact that the strikers
denied reinstatement "were the most active union officers or strike leaders." Memorandum
from Charles Fahy to A. Norman Somers, NLRB 20th Region, June 4, 1937, NLRB Records
(RG 25), Entry 155, Box 860, at 1.
76. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 92 F.2d 761, 763-65 (9th Cir. 1937).
77. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 35-37, NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (No. 706).
78. Brief for Respondent Mackay, supra note 65, at 49-50.
79. NLRB Reply Brief, supra note 72, at 15-17.
80. Fahy's own explanation does not provide significant evidence for or against the
account given here. Fahy tried to persuade the Court that the Board had already decided,
prior to the Mackay reply brief, that the employer enjoyed a right to hire permanent
replacements. NLRB Reply Brief, supra note 72, at 16. In support of this claim, the brief
cited three decisions: Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 3 N.L.R.B. 84 (1937), enforced, 94 F.2d 875
(2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 579 (1938); Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 248 (1936),
enforced as modified, 94 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 575 (1938); and
Jefferey-DeWitt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 618 (1936), enforced, 91 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937). In each of these cases, the Board reinstated unfair labor
practice strikers using language implying that the employer's provocation or prolongation of
the strike by unfair labor practices was important to the outcome. See Black Diamond S.S.
Corp., 3 N.L.R.B. at 93; Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. at 277; Jefferey-DeWitt Insulator
Co., 1 N.L.R.B. at 626-27. It does not appear, however, that the issue of the rights of
economic strikers was raised in any of these cases. By contrast, the issue was noted,
distinguished, and expressly left open in the Board's Mackay opinion. 1 N.L.R.B. at 216.
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attempting to accomplish by concession what the NLRB lawyers had
repeatedly failed to accomplish by explanation - namely, assuaging
fears that a holding for the Board in Mackay would effectively
empower it to compel employers to rehire all economic strikers. This
fear had already led to two Court of Appeals decisions applying the
Fifth Amendment to negate any Board power to reinstate strikers,
whether or not there had been discrimination among the strikers. But
if the Board could not convince skeptics of its narrow intentions, it
could outright negate any possible fears as to the broad issue by
conceding that issue in no uncertain terms. To pay for this negation,
the Board would give up only the dubious privilege of trying to defend
a general Board power to reinstate strikers against constitutional
challenges. Evidence that this would be a difficult task came not only
from conservative judicial activists like Judge Wilbur, but also from
proponents of deference like Augustus and Learned Hand. Two
months before Fahy made his concession, a panel of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals that included both Hands upheld a Board
order reinstating unfair labor practice strikers against due process
attack on grounds that implied economic strikers would not have
prevailed. " [N]o more is done," reasoned the court, "than to maintain
the status quo which existed on December 14, 1936, as against unfair
labor practices which occurred thereafter."81 The panel's use of this
rationale implied that if the strike had not been triggered by the
employer's unfair labor practices, the employer would have continued
to enjoy its constitutional right to select its employees. In short, it
seems likely that Fahy traded the permanent replacement issue for a
favorable holding on the constitutional objection to the reinstatement
order in Mackay.
At first, the Mackay dictum had little impact on the ground.
Strikers used mass picket lines to block even temporary replacements.
Employers called on police to open the lines, but unions insisted that
police action against "peaceful" mass picket lines amounted to
partisan intervention in violation of the right to strike. During the
great post-war strike wave of 1946 and 1947, the big industrial unions
of the CIO called mass demonstrations and mobilized political
pressure to keep the police "neutral" in labor disputes. In Rochester,
New York; Lancaster, Pennsylvania; Stamford, Connecticut; and
Oakland, California, workers staged city-wide general strikes to
protest police attacks on mass picket lines.82 Most unionized
employers soon gave up the idea of trying to operate with replacement
workers. While the official law continued to grant employers the right
81. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 94 F.2d at 879.
82. See GEORGE LIPSITZ, CLASS AND CULTURE IN COLD WAR AMERICA 130-42
(1981); ART PREIS, LABOR'S GIANT STEP: TwENTY YEARS OF THE CIO: 1936-55, at 267-72,
276-78 (1972).
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to operate during strikes, an unofficial norm barred them from doing
so. Writing in 1 956, Jack Barbash described the "prevailing situation"
in the United States: "[T]he employer . . . makes no attempt to operate
the plant during the strike and the picket line becomes only the
symbolic expression of the strike."83
By the early 1 960s, however, a new generation of managers had
begun to replace those who had experienced the mass picket lines of
the 1940s. Meanwhile, labor leaders had come to rely less on solidarity
and strike action than on government processes and employer
goodwill. When the new managers challenged the old norm, they were
pleasantly surprised to discover that labor's tradition of solidarity had
atrophied to the point that many workers were happy to cross picket
lines. By the mid-1980s, the Mackay rule had become fully effective on
the ground, and striking was no longer a viable option for most
workers.84
III.

How THE N ATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS B OARD LOST ITS
TEETH

The Supreme Court has ruled that the NLRB cannot act to deter
unfair labor practices, but must limit itself to remedying harms
inflicted by parties before the Board.85 As a result, employers have
little incentive to comply with the law. From a cost-benefit point of
view, it is often profitable to fire union advocates. If the employer can
avoid even a modest wage increase, the savings are likely to exceed
many times over the costs of any back-pay awards that the Board
might eventually assess.86 It is not surprising, then, that employers fire
or otherwise retaliate against one out of every eighteen private-sector
workers who support a union organizing campaign.87 In the late 1970s,
the labor movement and its allies waged a major campaign for
legislation to authorize penalties, but the resulting Labor Law Reform
83. JACK BARBASH, THE PRACTICE OF UNIONISM 227 (1956); see also LABOR STUDY
GROUP, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 88 (1961).
84. See LEON FINK, IN SEARCH OF THE WORKING CLASS 161-62 (1994); CHARLES R.
PERRY ET AL., OPERATING DURING STRIKES: COMPANY EXPERIENCE, NLRB POLICIES,
AND GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS 39-40 (1982); see also supra notes 54-57 and

accompanying text.
85. Republic Steel Corp. v.
52, at 88-89.

NLRB,

311 U.S. 7, 9-10 (1940);

GETMAN ET AL.,

supra note

86. See Morris M. Kleiner, What Will it Take? Establishing the Economic Costs to
Management of Noncompliance with the NLRA, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 137, 140-46 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994); Paul Weiler,
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1787-1803 (1983).
87. See Charles J. Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Activity
Under the NLRA and RLA, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 317, 330 (1998) (study based
on NLRB records).
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Bill of 1977-1978 fell victim to a Senate filibuster.88
The prohibition on Board deterrence has its origins in the Supreme
Court's 1938 decision in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB.89 There,
the Court announced that the Board's power to remedy unfair labor
practices was "remedial, not punitive" and that it must be exercised as
"a means of removing or avoiding the consequences of violation" not as a means of deterring the violations themselves - and even
then, only "where those consequences are of a kind to thwart the
purposes of the Act."90 As in Mackay, the Court offered no
explanation for its conclusion. Chief Justice Hughes forthrightly
depicted it as a matter of opinion:
We think that [the statutory] authority to order affirmative action does
not go so far as to confer a punitive jurisdiction enabling the B oard to
inflict upon the employer any penalty it may choose because he is

engaged in unfair labor practices, even though the Board be of the

opinion that the policies of the Act might be effectuated by such an
order.9 1

The Court's prohibition on deterrence finds scant support in the
statutory language, which authorizes the Board to order violators "to
cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this [Act]."92 The
very breadth of this language poses a problem for interpretation.
During the legislative hearings, one witness described it as "the
provision that . . . you may require them to do anything else that you
want them to do that you think is in accordance with the purpose of
the act" and complained that it was "so vague and indefinite that,
judging by previous court decisions as to statutes being void for
indefiniteness, I am not sure that that section is specific enough."93
Given this indeterminacy, it was inevitable that some combination
of Board and court jurisprudence would put limits on the Board's
88.
(1984).

RICHARD

B.

FREEMAN

&

JAMES

L.

MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS

Do? 202-04

89. 305 U.S. 197 (1938). Two subsequent cases are more frequently cited for the
proposition, but one of them relies on Consolidated Edison, while the other merely applies
the principle without stating it or providing any authority or reasoning. Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197-98 (1941); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 9-12
(1940).
90. Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 236 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 235-36.
92. National Labor Relations Act § lO(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000).
93. Hearings on S. 1 958 Before the S. Comm. On Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong. 448
(1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 35, at 1617, 1834 (testimony of
Robert T. Caldwell). This was the only on-point remark about the breadth of the Board's
remedial powers in the legislative history compiled by the Board, perhaps because the Act's
opponents put their main emphasis on attacking the procedure.
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discretion; the question was what the limits would be. However, the
Court's choice to draw the line so as to prohibit any consideration of
deterrence conflicted with the statutory command to order action that
would "effectuate the policies of this Act," all of which required the
deterrence of unfair labor practices and not merely their remediation.
The Act proceeded from the theory that unfair labor practices
triggered strikes, and strikes burdened commerce.94 Accordingly,
section 1 of the Act clearly set forth both ex ante deterrent and ex post
remedial policies, with ex ante deterrence coming first:
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have
occurred by encouraging the

practice and procedure of collective

bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
95

their employment or other mutual aid or protection.

Why, then, did the Court confine the Board to ex post remedial
objectives only? To answer this question, it will be necessary to
consider the factual context of the Court's holding in Consolidated
Edison. The Board had voided a number of collective bargaining
agreements between the Consolidated Edison Company and locals of
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), an
affiliate of the American Federation of Labor.96 The agreements had
been negotiated in the midst of an organizing effort by the United
Electrical Workers (UE), a CIO affiliate with a reputation for
militancy.97 The Board found that the company had discriminated
against the UE and in favor of the IBEW.98 According to the Board,
the company had discharged six UE activists, had engaged in
industrial espionage against the UE, and had provided material
assistance to the IBEW, including allowing its representatives to
conduct business on company property during working hours. In the
94. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 ("The denial by employers of
the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of
collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have
the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce . . . . ).
"

95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 218. For a more thorough discussion of the factual
background of the case plus a revealing analysis of the AFL's position, see CHRISTOPHER L.
TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED
LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, at 169-76 (1985).

97. Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 217-18. On the militancy of the UE, see generally
L. FILIPPELLI & MARK MCCOLLOCH, COLD WAR IN THE WORKING CLASS: THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF THE UNITED ELECTRICAL WORKERS (1995); RONALD W. SCHATZ,
THE ELECTRICAL WORKERS: A HISTORY OF LABOR AT G ENERAL ELECTRIC AND
WESTINGHOUSE, 1923-60 (1983).
RONALD

98. Consol. Edison Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 71, 94-95, 107-08 (1937).
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midst of these violations, the company recognized the IBEW locals as
the representatives for their members and commenced collective
bargaining. Within two months, the company had concluded
agreements with the IBEW locals, and those locals - which had
enrolled almost no members as of the grant of recognition - had
signed up 30,000 of the company's 38,000 employees. The Board found
that although the grant of recognition and the collective bargaining
agreement purported to cover IBEW members only, the company's
policy had been to negotiate with no other union and to extend the
collective bargaining agreements to all employees.99 Hence, the
contracts interfered with the workers' free choice of representatives
and had to be dissolved.
The Court disapproved this order for two reasons, both of which
flowed from constitutional concerns. First, the order conflicted with
the Court's view of how best to fulfill the constitutionally required
function of facilitating interstate commerce. As in Fansteel and
Mackay, the Board's decision had stressed this goal to the exclusion of
all others. It described in terrifying detail the "disastrous effect" that a
strike against such a large provider of electric and gas power would
inflict on interstate commerce.100 The Supreme Court heartily shared
this concern, but found the Board's solution perverse. Taking the
situation after the employer's violations as a given, Chief Justice
Hughes argued that because the IBEW contracts prohibited strikes
and provided for the arbitration of disputes, they were "highly
protective to interstate and foreign commerce." Voiding such
contracts, "even pending proceedings to ascertain by an election the
wishes of the majority of employees, would remove that salutary
protection during the intervening period." Thus, the contracts did not
"affect commerce" in a way that would justify their abrogation.101
To the Court, then, the statutory policy in favor of "full freedom of
association, self-organization and designation of representatives" was
contingent on a case-by-case judicial determination as to whether
vindicating those freedoms would facilitate interstate commerce. The
employer won in court because its admittedly illegal discrimination
was effective on the ground. Once eighty percent of the workers
acquiesced in the employer's choice of union, it became highly
unlikely that the violations would provoke a strike or otherwise
disrupt commerce. Since Consolidated Edison's illegal discrimination
had already worked to promote the "fundamental" purpose of
protecting commerce,102 it would be silly to insist that peace be
99. Id. at 93.
100. Id. at 79.
101. Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 237.
102 Id.
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achieved - if at all - through the exercise of worker freedom.
Second, the Court was concerned about the Board order's
intrusion on the parties' liberty of contract. The IBEW's lawyers had
argued that by "absolutely and utterly" destroying "existing contracts
of labor organizations of long established standing," the Board had
unconstitutionally taken the union's property and impaired the
obligation of contracts in violation of the Fifth Amendment.103 They
further urged the Court to apply a clear statement rule that " [p]ower
over and affecting the life, liberty, property and security of the citizen
may not be taken by inference, but only when the statute under which
it is claimed demonstrates a plain intent to grant it."104 Chief Justice
Hughes duly prefaced his analysis of the Board's statutory power to
order "affirmative action" by noting that "the Act gives no express
authority to the Board to invalidate contracts with independent labor
organizations."105 He then proceeded to hold that the IBEW's
members "had the right to choose the Brotherhood as their
representative for collective bargaining and to have contracts made as
the result of that bargaining" and that the employer's unfair labor
practices had not "deprived them of that right."106 Hughes purported
to derive this right from the statute but, as Christopher Tomlins has
pointed out, the ruling "was an important affirmation of the
supremacy of the common law of contract."107 To Hughes, the
employer's suppression of the UE and support for the IBEW could
not justify abrogating the IBEW contracts as long as that union had
any members "who joined voluntarily."108 The contract rights of those
members and their union thus trumped the statutory right of the
majority of workers to select "representatives of their own choosing."
In dissent, Justice Reed argued that the Board must be empowered
to "nullify advantages" that the employer had gained by favoring the
IBEW - a purpose that sounded more in deterrence than in
remedy.109 To hold otherwise would be "to withdraw from the Board
the specific authority granted by the Act to take affirmative action to
protect the workers' right of self-organization." Where the Board had
stressed solely the statutory purpose of protecting commerce, Reed
tried to build up the purpose of worker freedom. He agreed with Chief
Justice Hughes that the "fundamental purpose" of the Act was to
103. Brief for Petitioners International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers et al. at 4649, Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (No. 25).
104. Id. at 44.
105. Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 235.
106. Id. at 236.
107. TOMLINS, supra note 96, at 172 n.78.
108. Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 238.
109. Id. at 245 (Reed, J., joined by Black, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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protect commerce, and that this purpose was to be accomplished
through collectively bargained contracts. But to Reed, the statute
contemplated only contracts that had been negotiated by unions
"created through the self-organization of workers, free from
interference, restraint or coercion of the employer." The right of self
organization was "the basic privilege guaranteed by the Act,'' and
"[f]reedom from employer domination flows from freedom in self
organization. " 110
Reed's treatment of the statutory purposes undoubtedly tracked
the intentions of the Act's framers. They had elevated the commerce
protecting purpose over all others not because they believed it was
more important, but because it was the centerpiece of their
constitutional strategy. 1 1 1 However, once this purpose was given
priority in the statutory text, the Court could scarcely be blamed for
taking the framers at their word. Its twofold transgression lay, instead,
first in valuing the common law contract rights of the employer and
the IBEW over the statutory right of the employees to select their
bargaining representative, and second, in substituting its own, ex post
facto view of how to facilitate commerce in place of the statute's ex
ante goal of eliminating the causes of industrial disputes. In the years
following Consolidated Edison, the Court's specific holding on the
abrogation of contracts has been narrowed, 112 but its general
prohibition against the deterrence of unfair labor practices lives on.
IV. How UNION ORGANIZERS BECAME TRESPASSERS
Under the NLRA, the preferred method for establishing collective
bargaining is the union representation election. To most Americans,
the word "election" connotes a political contest between two parties
of equal legal status. The party currently in office is prohibited from
using the power of government against the opposition party. But
union representation campaigns are conducted on turf controlled by
one of the competing parties, namely the employer. Current law
allows employers to use this control to gain advantages unheard of in
political elections. The employer may command voters to attend anti
union rallies on pain of discharge. It may require voters to meet one
on-one with their supervisors to hear anti-union messages. And it may
adopt and enforce a rule prohibiting everyone but itself from
110. Id.
111. See Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 34, at 47-50.
112. See Milk & Ice Cream Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 98 v. McCulloch, 306 F.2d
763, 765-66 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (enforcing NLRB order abrogating contract between employer
and bona fide union, partly on the ground that " [c]ollective bargaining agreements,
conducive to industrial peace and stability, are of course encouraged; but the Act
contemplates that they shall be between management on the one hand and the freely chosen
representative of the employees on the other").
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campaigning during work time.113 Though daunting, these advantages
could be at least partly offset if union organizers could enter the
workplace to respond. But except in exceedingly rare circumstances,
employers also enjoy the right to exclude organizers from their
property.
In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court set forth the rule
that section 7 leaves intact the employer's property right to exclude
"nonemployee" union organizers from company property "except in
the rare case where 'the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective
the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them
through the usual channels."'114 The Board is "not permitted" to
balance the employees' statutory interest in receiving information
against the employer's "right to control the use of his property. "115
Instead, the employer's property rights automatically prevail unless
"unique obstacles" prevent communication, as in remote logging
camps, mining camps, and mountain resort hotels, where the
employees both live and work on the employer's premises.116 The
employer need not plead any business interest to justify excluding
organizers and may, in fact, restrict access for the precise purpose of
preventing communication from reaching its employees.117 Because
employees typically scatter after work, the Lechmere rule poses a
serious obstacle to organizing.118 Coupled with the rules permitting
1 13.

See

GETMAN ET AL.,

supra note

52,

at

51-52; HUMAN RIGHfS WATCH, UNFAIR

ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHfS STANDARDS 19-22 (2000); Craig Becker, Democracy in
the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV.
495, 557-60, 564-65 (1993).
1 14. 502 U.S. 527, 537 ( 1992)
1 1 3 ( 1956))

(quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,

351 U.S. 105,

(emphasis added).

115.

Id. at 537.

1 16.

Id. at 539, 541.

117. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty
STAN. L. REV. 305, 325 (1994) [hereinafter Estlund, Lechmere].

After Lechmere,

46

1 1 8. See James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace,
74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1577-78 ( 1996) (observing that the "shift to more anonymous

suburban residential patterns meant that increasingly dispersed employee populations were
less accessible to reasonable efforts at off-site communication," and pointing out that the
"usual channels for such communication - mail, telephone, home visits - also were less
likely to be effective because of people's fatigued response to the impersonal tactics of the
"solicitation industry"). The facts of Lechmere illustrate the problem. Despite the union's
good fortune in obtaining cooperation from the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles
in attaching names to employees' license plates, it was able to contact directly only 20
percent of the employees. In the Court's view, the section 7 right of the remaining 80 percent
to receive information about self-organization was satisfied as long as union organizers could
hold up placards along the public roadway. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 540. The Court has since
mitigated the effects of Lechmere for some unions by upholding the NLRB's ruling that a
paid union organizer who seeks employment at a company in order to organize its
employees is a statutory "employee" protected against discrimination in hiring and firing.
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 98 (1995). Departing sharply from its
approach in Lechmere, the Town & Country Court went straight to the statutory definition,
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employers to stage captive audience speeches and to campaign on
working time while barring workers from doing the same, it puts
unions at a gross disadvantage in communicating with voters.
In contrast to Mackay and Consolidated Edison, the Lechmere
opinion does cite authority and provide reasoning in support of its
rule. At issue was the validity of the Board's standard requiring
employers to grant access to union organizers in certain circum
stances.119 Under the rule of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,120 the Board's standard was entitled to broad
deference unless the Court could find contrary "clear meaning" in the
statute.121 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas found that "clear
meaning" in section 7 of the Act, which guarantees the right of self
organization only to "employees."122 He pointed to the "critical
distinction between the organizing activities of employees (to whom
section 7 guarantees the right of self-organization) and nonemployees
(to whom section 7 applies only derivatively)."123 By itself, this left
open the question why union organizers, who are "employees" of the
union and who are aligned with other employees in collective
bargaining, are not "employees" under section 7. The obvious place to
look for an answer to this question would be the statutory definition of
the term "employee," which is contained in section 2(3) of the Act.
But Justice Thomas chose to conduct his search for the statute's
"clear meaning" without so much as a glance at the relevant portion of
the statute itself. Why this omission? Section 2(3) states that "[t]he
term 'employee' . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed . . .
by any . . . person who is not an employer as herein defined."124 Justice
Thomas could have argued that full-time union organizers are
excluded from this definition because they are employed by labor
organizations, which are not statutory employers except when they are
"acting as" employers.125 In the union-organizing setting, the union is
giving its broad language full effect. Id. at 89-93. The unanimity of the Town & Country
opinion suggests that it might have been a "make-up call" for the heavily criticized Lechmere
decision.
119. The Board's standard was announced in Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 16-19
(1988).
120. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
121. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 536-37.
122. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) ; Lechmere, 502 U.S. at
537 ("By reversing the Board's interpretation of the statute for failing to distinguish between
the organizing activities of employees and nonemployees, we were saying, in Chevron terms,
that § 7 speaks to the issue of nonemployee access to an employer's property.").
123. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 533.
124. National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2002).
125. National Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2002) ("The term
'employer' . . . shall not include . . . any labor organization (other than when acting as an
employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.").
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certainly not acting as an employer. However, there is legislative
history that weakens this argument. Philip Levy, one of the statute's
drafters, proposed language specifying that union organizers are
statutory "employees," but it was not included "apparently because it
was thought not to be necessary."126 Why would Levy's language be
unnecessary? Perhaps because it was clear to all concerned that the
partial exclusion of labor organizations from the definition of
"employer" provided no reason at all to hold that union organizers who are clearly statutory employees in relation to their own employers
- should lose that status when performing their function of
organizing workers. Labor organizations were partially excluded from
the definition of "employer" so that they could not be charged with
employer unfair labor practices under then-section 8(3), now section
(8)(a)(3). "Otherwise the provisions of the bill which prevent
employers from participating in the organizational activities of
workers would extend to labor unions as well, and thus would deprive
unions of one of their normal functions. "127 In other words, labor
organizations were excluded from the definition of "employer"
precisely so that they could participate in organizing. In light of this
purpose, it would be ironic indeed to seize on the definition of
"employer" to prevent union organizers from "participating in the
organizational activities of workers."
Whatever the reason, Justice Thomas chose to rely not on the
statute, but on the Court's pre-Chevron decision in NLRB v. Babcock
and Wilcox Co. 128 In Babcock, the Court had overturned a series of
Board orders requiring employers to permit union organizers on their
property. The Board had erred, the Court held, by "fail[ing] to make a
distinction between rules of law applicable to employees and those
applicable to nonemployees."129 Unfortunately for Justice Thomas'
rationale, however, the terms "nonemployee" and "employee" as used
by the Babcock Court had nothing whatever to do with the statutory
term "employees" contained in section 7, and thus could not meet the
Chevron requirement of "clear meaning" in the statute.130 As of 1956,
126. ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 134 (13th ed.
2001) (citing Memorandum from Philip Levy, to Calvert Magruder (Apr. 17, 1935)).
127. S. REP. No. 74-573, at 6 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
35, at 2300, 2305.
128. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
129. Id. at 113.
130. By relying on a pre-Chevron decision, the Lechmere court effectively
grandfathered in the Babcock Court's nondeferential approach. Cf Estlund, Ossification,
supra note 55, at 1598-99 (suggesting "a kind of retroactive application of Chevron, through
which the Board would be able to revisit old judicial resolutions of textual ambiguities that,
in a Chevron world, would have been left to the agency," and pointing out that, "under the
proposed approach, Lechmere, in which the Board had sought to revise that resolution,
should have come out differently").
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when Babcock was decided, the terms "nonemployee" and
"employee" had an established usage in cases involving union
organizer access to employer property. Courts used the term
"nonemployee" in contradistinction not to a statutory "employee"
entitled to section 7 rights, but to an employee who was employed by
the particular employer and therefore rightfully on the property.131 Not
only was this usage developed without any reference to the statutory
term "employee," but it directly conflicted with the statutory
definition. "The term 'employee,"' declares the statute, "shall not be
limited to the employees of a particular employer."132 But if the statute
did not distinguish between employees and nonemployees of a
particular employer, the common law of trespass did. As the Board
read Babcock, the distinction hinged on the fact "that the
nonemployees in Babcock & Wilcox sought to trespass on the
employer's property, whereas the employees" did not.133 Accordingly,
the Board held that employers enjoyed the property right under
Babcock to exclude even their own off-duty employees - clearly
statutory employees entitled to section 7 rights - without pleading
any business reason.134 In short, Babcock's distinction between
nonemployees and employees rested not on the statute but on the
common law of trespass, raising once again the question of how state
common law rights could trump federal statutory rights.135
Unlike the opinions in Mackay and Consolidated Edison, the
Babcock opinion addressed this issue directly. "Organization rights
are granted to workers, by the same authority, the National
Government, that preserves property rights," declared the Court.
"Accommodation between the two must be obtained with as little
destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the
131. See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 1955), gaffs
351 U.S. 105 (1956) (distinguishing "non-employee organizers" from "union organizers who
were employees of each company respectively" and contrasting "employee and non
employee union members").
132. National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) . This language was
inserted precisely to counter the persistent tendency of courts to limit the class of workers
entitled to rights. See ATLESON, supra note 1, at 62; Estlund, Lechmere, supra note 1 17, at
329.
133. See, e.g., Schwab Foods, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1076 (1987) (quoting Eastex, Inc.
v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 571 (1978)).
134. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 921 (1973). The employer's right to exclude off
duty employees has since been qualified. See Tri-County Medical Center, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B.
1089, 1089 (1976) (announcing that an employer rule barring off-duty employees is valid "if
it (1) limits access solely with respect to the interior of the plant and other working areas; (2)
is clearly disseminated to all employees; and (3) applies to off-duty employees seeking access
to the plant for any purpose and not just to those employees engaging in union activity").
135. Despite Justice Thomas's reference to the term "employees" in section 7,
Lechmere, like Babcock & Wilcox before it, has been read not as incorporating the statutory
definition of employee, but the common law distinction between trespassers and invitees.
See Estlund, Lechmere, supra note 117, at 324-25.
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other."136 Of course, as any first-year law student can testify, property
rights are creatures of state law, not the "National Government."
National involvement in property law can, however, be found in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
which prohibit national and state government from depriving a person
of property without due process of law or from taking property
"without j ust compensation."137 This was the approach urged by the
company's lawyers,138 and it is the only apparent explanation of the
Babcock Court's reference to the "National Government," which, in
turn, is the only rationale for the rule of Lechmere.
Commenting on Babcock, James Atleson remarked that, in light of
the opinion's failure to cite the statutory definition of "employee," the
Supreme Court evidently "feels free to apply common-law property
notions without any felt need to respond to either the language of the
act or its history."139 That the Lechmere Court subsequently managed
to find "clear meaning" in the statute sufficient to evade Chevron still without once citing the governing statutory definition - attests to
the arrogance of this judicial liberty. Aside from the reference to the
national government in Babcock, and an occasional explicit invocation
of the Constitution by dissenting Justices or lower courts,140 judges
have left the trumping power of property rights unexplained and
unexamined.
v.

How E MPLOYERS WON THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO CLASS
S OLIDARITY

Class solidarity has not fared well in American courts. Under the
common law, judges held that strikes were lawful only if the strikers
were motivated by the prospect of immediate economic gain for
themselves; broader or more attenuated motives were condemned as
"malicious."141 When statutes began to displace the common law,
courts carried this approach over into their statutory interpretations.
Absent a strong showing of immediate worker self-interest, collective
action falls outside the NLRA's protection for concerted activities for
136. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
137. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
138. Brief for Respondent, at 17, NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956)
(No. 250).
139.

ATLESON,

supra note 1, at 62.

140. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 580 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., with Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (quoted supra, text accompanying note 9); NLRB v. Windemuller Electric,
Inc., 34 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1994).
141. See Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1013 (Mass. 1900); TOMLINS, supra note 96, at 44.
On the use of the term "malice" to describe forbidden objectives, see Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1894).
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mutual aid or protection.142 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
construed the Act's secondary boycott ban broadly to include political
boycotts on the ground that it is "more rather than less objectionable"
for a union to pursue non-traditional objectives instead of higher
wages and better working conditions for its own members.143
But in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., the
Court carved out a limited but increasingly important exception for
employer class solidarity.144 Reversing its usual preference for
narrowly self-interested activity, the Court ruled that an employer
may close a facility to punish its employees for choosing union
representation provided that the employer is not motivated by
economic self-interest.145 Management had threatened to close a
textile mill that was the economic mainstay of a small southern town if
the workers voted to be represented by the Textile Workers Union.146
Nevertheless, the union won the election by a small margin. Six days
later, the company's board of directors voted to close the plant and
terminate all 500 employees.147 Supervisors forthrightly told the
workers that the shutdown was because of the union vote, and that the
workers would be blacklisted in their search for jobs.148 Eighty-three
percent of the workers then signed a petition renouncing the union,
but the top management official declared that "[a]s long as there are
seventeen percent of the hard core crowd here, I refuse to run the
,,
mill. 149
Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." It is difficult to imagine
a more dramatic and effective means of coercing employees than to
punish them by closing their workplace altogether. The facts of
Darlington provide a graphic illustration. Within weeks of the closing,
a majority of the union voters had renounced their support for the
union in a desperate attempt to recover their jobs.150 The Board found
142. Richard Michael Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected
Protest Activities Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 793-814,
864 (1989); ATLESON, supra note 1, at 10.
143. Int'! Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'!, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225-26 (1982)
(quoting the lower court's opinion, Allied Int'!, Inc. v. Int'! Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d
1368, 1378 (1st Cir. 1981)); see also Alan Hyde, Economic Labor Law v. Political Labor
Relations: Dilemmas for Liberal Legalism, 60 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1981) (analyzing and
critiquing the distinction between political and economic activity by unions).
144. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
145. Id. at 272.
146. Id. at 265.
147. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 243 (1962).
148. Id. at 244 n.10, 279, 281-82.
149. Id. at 244.
150. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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unfair labor practices and ordered that the employees be made whole
for wages lost from the time of the closing until they found
substantially equivalent employment.151
But the Supreme Court announced a new rule that "some
employer decisions are so peculiarly matters of management
prerogative" they cannot violate section 8(a)(l) no matter how great
their impact on section 7 rights, unless they also violate section
8(a)(3), which requires a showing of anti-union discrimination.152
Furthermore, the Court continued, proof of management's anti-union
hostility - of which there was plenty in Darlington
is not enough to
establish discrimination. The employer may intentionally destroy the
union and punish the workers for exercising their statutory rights
unless the Board can prove that these actions were undertaken for the
specific purpose of obtaining future economic benefits from the
employer's remaining employees.153 Applying these principles, the
Court held that a corporation has an "absolute right" to terminate its
employees and go out of business altogether regardless of the impact
on section 7 rights - there being no remaining employees from whom
to obtain future benefits.154 Further, a corporation may close a part of
its business in retaliation for the exercise of section 7 rights unless the
NLRB can prove that the closing had the purpose of chilling unionism
among the corporation's remaining employees.155
Darlington has exerted an increasingly devastating impact on
unions as technological advances have smoothed the way for
corporations to move their operations.156 As we have seen, companies
are permitted to shut down facilities for retaliatory purposes without
any regard for the rights of employees at the closed facilities; the only
employees who count are those at the company's other, still-operating
facilities. But if those operating facilities are not in the United States,
then their employees are not covered by the Act, and the shutdown
could not have been for the purpose of chilling their non-existent
section 7 rights. "By focusing on the chilling effect on any remaining
domestic employees, instead of on the discrimination practiced against
those who lost their jobs," observes Terry Collingsworth, "the
-

151. Id. at 253-56.
152. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. at 269.
153. Id. at 270-72.
154. Id. at 268.
155. Id. at 275. This issue arose because the Board had held that the Darlington
Company was controlled by a parent company, the Deering Milliken Corporation, and that
Deering-Millikin could be held responsible for Darlington's unfair labor practices.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. at 257-58.
156. See Abner J. Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor
Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1123, 1129 (1986).
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Court . . . has immunized multinational runaways." 1 57
The Darlington Court's failure to consider the coercive impact of
the closing on the terminated workers and their town has sparked
vigorous criticism over the years. Clyde Summers set the tone early
on:
The essence of the Court's logic is that discharge for supporting the
union is not itself an unfair labor practice, that it is no wrong as to the
ones discharged, and that the law is not concerned with their inj ury.
Discrimination against them is an evil only when it intimidates others;
any remedy given them is only to make others feel secure. This is to see
in the execution of hostages nothing more than an intimidation of the

living; it is to make murder a crime only when the killer's purpose is to
5
instill fear. 1 8

Why did the Court tum a blind eye to the terminated workers? As
to Darlington, the Court asserted that "so far as the Labor Relations
Act is concerned, an employer has the absolute right to terminate his
entire business for any reason he pleases. "159 To explain this assertion,
the Court contrasted the retaliatory plant closing with the (concededly
illegal) retaliatory lockout. An employer might use a lockout to win
economic concessions from workers, but:
[A] complete liquidation of a business yields no such future benefit for
the employer, if the termination is bona fide. It may be motivated more
by spite against the union than by business reasons, but it is not the type
of

discrimination

which

is

prohibited

by

the

Act.

The

personal

satisfaction that such an employer may derive from standing on his
beliefs and the mere possibility that other employers will follow his
example are surely too remote to be considered dangers at which the
labor statutes were aimed. Although employees may be prohibited from
engaging in a strike under certain conditions, no one would consider it a
violation of the Act for the same employees to quit their employment en
masse, even if motivated by a desire to ruin the employer. The very

permanence of such action would negate any future economic benefit to
the employees. The employer's right to go out of business is no
60

different. 1

The Court's attempted analogy between permanent plant closings
and employees quitting is simply nonsensical. The reason why no one
157. Terry Collingsworth, Resurrecting the National Labor Relations Act - Plant
Closings and Runaway Shops in a Global Economy, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 72, 106
(1993).
158. Clyde Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALE L.J. 59, 67
(1965); see also ATLESON, supra note 1, at 141-42; Julius G. Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 735, 754-55
(1965) [hereinafter Getman, Section 8(a) (3)]; Robert A. Gorman, The Negligible Impact of
the National Labor Relations Act on Managerial Decisions to Close or Relocate, 58 TuL. L.
REV. 1354, 1359 (1984).
159. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965).
160. Id. at 272.
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would consider it a violation of the Act for employees to quit for the
purpose of ruining an employer is that the Act does not even purport
to prohibit employees from doing anything; it prohibits labor
organizations or their agents from restraining or coercing employers in
the selection of their representatives for purposes of collective
bargaining. 1 61 If a union ordered workers to quit permanently in order
to punish an employer for exercising its freedom to select
representatives (the appropriate analogy), there is little doubt that the
Board and the courts would find an unfair labor practice.
On further examination, the statement only becomes more
mysterious. As we have seen, courts have long held that strikes
become more - not less - vulnerable to legal suppression when they
are motivated by considerations other than economic gain. This
principle is grounded on the idea that because a strike involves the
deliberate infliction of economic damage, it is justifiable only if the
strikers themselves have an observable interest at stake. 1 62 Yet, under
Darlington, employers enjoy the privilege of dealing catastrophic
economic damage to entire working class communities not only despite
their lack of any observable economic interest, but because they have
no such interest and may - in fact - be "motivated . . . by spite
against the union. " Thus, Darlington stands the old common-law
malice test exactly on its head: for employers, malicious motivation
can be a ticket to legal immunity.
But in fact, of course, there is much more to retaliatory shutdowns
than mere spite or malice. Like sympathy strikes and secondary
strikes, they produce valuable benefits - benefits that are reaped not
directly by the perpetrator, but by fellow members of the perpetrator's
class. The shutdown operates like a public flogging, intimidating not
only the victims themselves, but also every worker who hears of their
plight. Darlington excludes this effect from consideration unless the
employer stands to gain individually from the intimidation of its own
remaining employees. Employers that act out of class solidarity,
helping to produce a cowed and compliant workforce for their fellow
employers, are privileged to commit what would otherwise be
statutory violations.
How, then, can Darlington be explained? Without specifically
mentioning the Constitution, the Court applied the clear statement
rule: "A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out
of business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation
that it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of
161. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2000) ("It shall be
an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(1) to restrain or coerce . . .
(B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective
bargaining. . . . " (emphasis added)).
-

162 See CHARLES 0. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 107-10 (2d rev. ed. 1961).
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legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the
Labor Relations Act."163 At the equivalent juncture in the opinion
below, the Court of Appeals made the constitutional connection
explicit. "A statute authorizing an order forcing the continued pursuit
of operations in these circumstances," opined the court, "would be of
doubtful validity. "164
The Supreme Court's reference to "a single businessman"
choosing to go out of business invokes the rights both of property and
contract. This problem was mentioned on the floor of Congress, where
proponents of the NLRA assured opponents that the bill would not
prevent an operator from closing "his" plant.165 Like our other four "of
course" statements, then, Darlington can be explained as a belated
echo of Lochner-era economic due process.
But if the Court was Lochnerizing, it was doing an awfully poor
job of it. After all, Darlington and Deering-Milliken were both
corporations - not "single" businessmen. Moreover, the Board did
not order anyone to remain in business; it required only that the
corporations compensate employees who were terminated for
retaliatory reasons. The Supreme Court did not comment on this
point; it simply assumed that the Board's ruling was equivalent to the
"proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of
business if he wants to." But obviously the government can impose
some burdens on going out of business, for example taxes on the sale
of assets. It is not at all clear why the employer's liberty interest
requires not only that it should be allowed to go out of business for
retaliatory reasons, but also that it be freed from any obligation to
factor in the cost of compensating terminated employees for the loss
of their statutory right to organize.166
How then, do we make sense of Darlington? Is the decision
"inherently incredible,"167 as an exasperated Clyde Summers
concluded years ago? Maybe, but there is another possibility. Perhaps
we could make some sense of Darlington by reading it as a modern
163. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. at 270.
164. Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682, 685 (4th Cir. 1963), vacated by, 380
U.S. 263 (1965).
165. 79 CONG. REC. 7673, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 35, at 2394
(statement of Sen. Walsh) ("[T]here are some fundamental rights an employer has, just as
there are rights an employee has. No one can compel an employer to keep his factory
open."); 79 CONG. REC. 9682, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 35, at 3110
(statement of Rep. Griswold) ("There is nothing in the bill to keep an operator from closing
his plant. There is nothing in the bill that says you shall reach an agreement - nothing of
that sort.").
166. See Getman, Section B(a) (J), supra note 158, at 754 (observing that "the conclusion
that an employer should not be forced to stay in business against his will does not require the
further conclusion that his conduct in closing down is outside the scope of the Act").
167. Summers, supra note 158, at 67.
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constitutional decision. In the constitutional law of the post-New Deal
era, as in Darlington, non-economic motivation weighs in favor of
legal protection. For example, political speech occupies a higher
position on the "hierarchy of first amendment values" than
commercial speech, 168 and politically-motivated boycotts higher than
economically-motivated boycotts.169 Put this together with the
established - albeit bitterly criticized - principle that corporations
are entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as natural
persons, and we have a constitutional explanation for Darlington 's
right of corporations to stand on their beliefs and punish workers for
unionizing. On this view, the anomaly in the law lies not in Darlington
itself, but in the Court's failure to apply the same rule to unions that
refuse to handle goods for solidaristic or political reasons. If non
economic motivation weighs against the suppression of employer
conduct, then why should the same motivation make union conduct
"more rather than less objectionable" and thus subject to greater
restriction?170
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE PERFECT CRIME

This Essay has examined five important labor law doctrines that
were originally announced as "of course" propositions. In each case,
the proposition in question deployed an employer right grounded in
state common law as a trump over a labor right grounded in federal
168. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980); see, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.
Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 506-09 (1988) (explaining that a corporation's efforts to
influence a private standard-setting organization were not entitled to full first amendment
protection because the company was economically motivated); Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983) (holding that pamphlets combining product descriptions
with commentary on the desirability of contraceptives in general were commercial speech in
part because of the company's "economic motivation" for selling them).
169. Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-12 (1982) (holding
that a "politically motivated" civil rights boycott was protected under the First
Amendment), with Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,
427 (1990) (holding that a boycott by court-appointed defense lawyers could be
constitutionally prohibited in part because the lawyers' "immediate objective was to increase
the price that they would be paid for their services").
170. Int'! Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'!, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225-26 (1982). For
criticism of the Court's treatment of political and solidaristic labor protest, see ATLESON,
supra note 1, at 68-74; Fischl, supra note 142, at 865; Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free
Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4, 17-18 (1984); Hyde,
supra note 143; Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations,
our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of DeBarto1o, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149, 16870 (1990); Gary Minda, The Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 807, 826-30
(1993); James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values: Two Rungs
and a Black Hole, 1 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 189-91, 225-27 (1984); see also Seth
Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 685 (1985)
(presenting a carefully crafted effort to rationalize and harmonize the leading cases in a way
that would provide a far greater degree of protection for political protest by labor than has
been implemented either by courts or the Board).
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statutory law - thus reversing the normal hierarchy of laws. And in
each case, it turned out that what the Supreme Court treated as a
matter "of course," had been justified by lawyers and lower court
judges in constitutional terms. State common law rights of property
and contract were elevated above federal statutory rights of self
organization and collective action through Lochner-era notions of
economic due process and interstate commerce.
This summary leaves us with some important questions. First, if
these decisions are best explained in terms of constitutional law, then
why didn't the Supreme Court just come out and say so? The answer
may be found in the Court's experience with its Fansteel opinion, the
only one of the five to mention the Constitution directly. Although the
opinion as a whole drew mixed reactions, the constitutional language
in particular drew harsh criticism. Professor J. Denson Smith charged
that Fansteel had revived the discredited economic due process
decisions of Coppage v. Kansas and Adair v. United States.111 Once
again, he explained, the due process clause had been applied to the
employer-employee relationship so as "to protect the general control
of the former over the latter," and this time "even during a period of
industrial strife, and notwithstanding that the employer had been
guilty of unfair labor practices under the Act."172 Others agreed.173 On
the assumption that Fansteel partook of the pre-New Deal mentality,
New York Times columnist Arthur Krock predicted that the
dissenters' position - which was "eloquent of New Deal reasoning" in
emphasizing the Board's statutory power to remedy unfair labor
practices - would eventually prevail.174 The reaction to Fansteel's
constitutional language signaled that if the Court were to persist in
openly resurrecting economic due process in labor law, it would do so
at a heavy cost in legitimacy.
So the Justices hid the economic due process in "of course"
statements. And, just as importantly, they pushed it away from what
were then the central issues and to the margins - out of the political
and professional spotlights.175 Many of the "of course" statements
171. J. Denson Smith, Comment, From Nose-Thumbing to Sabotage: The Fansteel Sit
Down Decision, 1 LA. L. REV. 577, 577 (1939).
172 Id. at 580.
173. See, e.g., Frank Thomas Miller, Jr., Comment, Labor Law
Sit-Down Strikes Reinstatement of Employees Under the Wagner Act, 17 N.C. L. REV. 438, 439 (1939); Recent
Decision, Labor Law: Power of the National Labor Relations Board to Order Reinstatement
of Sit-Down Strikers, 27 CAL. L. REV. 470, 472-73 (1939).
-

174. Arthur Krock, Implications in the dissents of Reed and Black, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1939, at 20.
175. This phenomenon followed the pattern modeled by Jack Balkin as "the crystalline
structure of law." Balkin shows how a dominant principle may triumph over a competing
counterprinciple in a central case, yet remain vulnerable to the suppressed counter-principle
in more marginal cases. J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39
RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986).
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were barely noticed at the time. It is only over the past several
decades, as their impact has been magnified by social and economic
change, that they have emerged as central issues. Taken together, they
may account for a substantial proportion of the decline in the
American labor movement. The permanent replacement rule of
Mackay, ignored at the time and rarely utilized until the 1980s, now
operates to prevent workers from exercising their right to strike for
better conditions.176 The no-deterrence rule of Consolidated Edison,
also little noted at the time, now ensures that even when employers
are caught red-handed, they stand to gain financially from violating
workers' rights. 177 The employer's right to exclude union organizers
under Babcock & Wilcox and Lechmere poses an increasingly
formidable barrier to union-worker communication as more and more
jobs are located in self-contained facilities like malls, shopping centers,
industrial parks and office parks.178 Finally, the employer's right announced in Darlington - to punish workers for unionizing by
closing their place of employment out of "spite," which was
considered at the time unlikely to be exercised very often, now causes
serious problems due to the increasingly global scope of economic
activity.179
This brings us to the question of legitimacy. Had the Court openly
grounded these rulings in the Constitution, it is highly unlikely that
they would remain good law today. For half a century, the Court has
disavowed economic due process. Despite academic efforts to revive
Lochner, the decision continues to operate as a negative precedent,

176. Befort, supra note 56, at 440-41 (recounting that employers did not begin to make
extensive use of the permanent replacement rule until after 1981, when President Ronald
Reagan used the tactic to defeat the air traffic controllers' strike). On the recent impact of
Mackay, see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. At the time of the decision, unionists
and their legal allies focused on the positive aspects of the case, not even bothering to
mention the permanent replacement issue. See, e.g., Supreme Court's O.K. Of NLRB In
Mackay Case Blow To Tories, UNION NEWS SERVICE: COMMITTEE FOR INDUS. ORG., May
20, 1938, at 1.
177. On the impact of the no-deterrence rule today, see supra notes 85-88 and
accompanying text. Like Mackay, Consolidated Edison raised a number of issues, and the
Board prevailed on all except one. For contemporary reports, see, for example, Ward P.
Allen, Recent Decisions, Labor Law - Power of National Labor Relations Board to
Invalidate Contract Between Employer and Bona Fide Union, 37 MICH. L. REV. 660, 663
(1939), and Recent Cases, Labor Law - National Labor Relations Act - Abrogation of
Contracts Signed During Pendency of NLRB Proceedings, 52 HARV. L. REV. 695, 695-96
(1939).
178. On the impact of Babcock & Wilcox and Lechmere, see supra note 118 and
accompanying text.
179. On the effects of Darlington today, see supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
While the Darlington decision was heavily criticized at the time, nobody contested the
Supreme Court's view that there was nothing more than a "mere possibility" that other
employers would follow Darlington's lead. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co.,
380 U.S. 263, 272 (1965).
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and the charge of Lochnerizing rarely fails to elicit strong denials.180
But by couching its rulings as matters of statutory construction, the
Court has entrenched them against change. As Cynthia Estlund
recently observed, labor law has ossified. No matter how devoid of
statutory reasoning or how destructive of the statute's purposes in
light of changed conditions, old Supreme Court constructions of the
statute are accorded a kind of super stare decisis.181 Not only are the
corpses in labor law buried in "of course" statements, then, but they
are buried deeply, beyond the reach of judicial or administrative
change. Through misdirection, the Court has pulled off the perfect
crime.
-

180. On the continuing vitality of Lochner as a negative precedent, see, for example,
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 605 (1995) (Thomas, J. concurring) (denying that the
majority was reviving Lochner), and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 690-691 (1999) (same). On the failure of efforts to
rehabilitate Lochner, see Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 221, 222, 243 (1999).
181. See Estlund, Ossification, supra note 55, at 1561.

